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Findings from the deception detection literature suggest that although people are not skilled
in consciously detecting a liar, they may intuit that something about the person telling a
lie is off. In the current proposal, we argue that observing a liar inﬂuences the observer’s
physiology even though the observer may not be consciously aware of being lied to (i.e.,
the observers’ direct deception judgment does not accurately differentiate between liars
and truth-tellers).To test this hypothesis, participants’ ﬁnger temperature will be measured
while they watch videos of persons who are either honest or dishonest about their identity.
We hypothesize that skin temperature will be lower when observing a liar than when
observing a truth-teller. Additionally, we test whether perceiving a liar inﬂuences ﬁnger
skin temperature differently when an individual is, or is not, alerted to the possibility of
deceit.We do this by varying participants’ awareness of the fact that they might be lied to.
Next to measuring physiological responses to liars and truth-tellers, self-reported direct and
indirect veracity judgments (i.e., trustworthiness and liking) of the target persons will be
assessed.We hypothesize that indirect veracity judgments will better distinguish between
liars and truth-tellers than direct veracity judgments.
Keywords: deception detection, physiological markers, indirect deception detection, interpersonal relations, non-
conscious perception, skin temperature
MEASURING UNCONSCIOUS DECEPTION DETECTION BY
SKIN TEMPERATURE
Deception is omnipresent and, next to it’s often intended beneﬁts,
can have grave interpersonal consequences. A skill for knowing
what information to trust is thus an indispensable tool in daily
life. Even so, a robust ﬁnding in the deception detection litera-
ture is that people are no better than chance at detecting a liar
(Bond and DePaulo, 2006). If untruths are discovered, they are
mostly found out long after the fact or never at all (DePaulo et al.,
2004). Yet, research has also shown that people are better able
to detect liars when measures are used that do not directly ask
them to judge whether someone is lying. Building on evidence
suggesting that people are able to differentiate between liars and
truth-tellers if asked indirectly, we aim to test the existence of an
unconscious indicator (i.e., a physiologicalmarker) of this indirect
deception detection. In the current paper, we propose to mea-
sure skin temperature, as we believe that this physiological proxy
of social interaction could be an important indicator of people’s
correct intuition toward liars.
INTUITIVE DECEPTION DETECTION
As noted above, people are not very good at verbalizing whether
another individual is lying or not. Indeed, people’s direct veracity
judgments rarely exceed what could be expected on the basis of
chance (Bond and DePaulo, 2006). Yet when people’s judgment
of a liar is assessed in an indirect way, they do seem to be able to
distinguish the liar from the truth-teller. Although this does not
mean that people are aware that they are being lied to, it doesmean
that compared to truth-tellers, people’s impressions of, or feelings
toward, liars are different. One telling piece of evidence for people’s
ability to indirectly detect deception is a study comparing direct
(“Is the person lying?”) to indirect (“Does the person have to think
hard”) judgmentsmade by police ofﬁcers (Vrij et al., 2001). Results
of this study indicate that the indirect judgments distinguished
between liars and truth-tellers (i.e., the liars were judged to be
thinking harder), whereas the direct judgments did not.
A meta-analysis touching upon indirect deception detection
also found that people report more conﬁdence in their judg-
ment after perceiving a truthful compared to a dishonest message
(DePaulo et al., 1997), leading authors to conclude that this sup-
ported the idea that feelings of conﬁdence—as indirect measures
of deceptiondetection—might differentiate truths from lies. Addi-
tionally, subjective impressions seem to distinguish liars from
truth-tellers better than objectivemeasures. In theirmeta-analysis,
DePaulo et al. (2003) found that subjective measures of verbal
immediacy (e.g., active vs. passive voice), eye contact, and facial
pleasantness all discriminated between a liar and a truth-teller,
whereas the objective measurements of these features (e.g., the
coding of their occurrences by independent researchers) did not.
The most compelling evidence for people’s ability to sense some-
one is lying comes from research comparing an intuitive to a
more deliberative processing style. Albrechtsen et al. (2009) found
that intuitive judgments of deception were more accurate than
deliberative judgments. On top of this, these authors found
that automatic judgments made when conscious attention was
directed at a concurrent task were more accurate than judgments
made after conscious reasoning about ones deception judgment.
These ﬁndings suggest that, on some level, people intuit that
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they are being lied to while they are forming an impression of a
liar.
The fact that directly judging someone to be a liar is difﬁcult is
understandable considering that there is a lack of cues that people
can use to reliably detect a liar (DePaulo et al., 2003). Yet even
though cues might be weak, some evidence of their presence does
exist. Liars are perceived as more tense and less forthcoming, they
have less compelling stories, speak in a higher pitch, and make a
more negative impression—truth-tellers, on the other hand, come
across more direct, certain, and more personal (DePaulo et al.,
2003). Although not always consciously aware of it, people are
very good at picking up subtle cues from their social environment
(Bargh and Chartrand, 1999). This is, for instance, supported by
both research on mimicking suggesting that non-verbal behavior
is regulated mostly outside of conscious awareness and that it
has consequences at the behavioral level (Chartrand and Bargh,
1999; Stel et al., 2008), and research on emotional face-to-face
communication (Dimberg et al., 2000). Similarly, as we suggest
here, people might thus unconsciously pick up on some of the less
apparent cues given away by a liar.
Our reasoning is based on indications that forming impressions
of the intentions of other people seems to be an automatic process,
one that has been argued to be evolved in order to enhance chances
of survival (Fiske et al., 2007). More speciﬁcally, to the extent that
forming alliances with trustworthy others beneﬁts survival and
reproduction, being able to detect trustworthiness in others has
adaptive value. One major marker for trustworthiness is emo-
tional expressivity, where emotional expressiveness is positively
related to being judged as trustworthy (Boone and Buck, 2003).
As liars may try to control their expressive behaviors (DePaulo
et al., 2003), liars could generally be perceived as less trustworthy.
People judge trustworthiness of others very rapidly (Willis and
Todorov, 2006), and base their social decision-making on it (van ’t
Wout and Sanfey, 2008). People are also especially good at judging
someone’s warmth—an indication of the favorability of another
persons’ intentions toward us—as compared to their competence
(Fiske et al., 2007). In similar vein, people judge liars less likable
and less trustworthy than truth-tellers, and tend to increase their
own deceptive behavior toward a liar (Tyler et al., 2006). It appears
that people are wired to detect friendly intent or potential threats
in others, and adjust their behavior toward them accordingly.
Seminal work has demonstrated that from early on in life,
being able to know who to trust and forming emotional attach-
ments is essential for development (Bowlby, 1969), and that
physical contact is essential for survival and psychological well-
being (Harlow, 1958). Accordingly, it has been argued that
the association between warmth and trust is strengthened dur-
ing early development, as physical warmth usually co-occurs
with care from trusted others (IJzerman and Koole, 2011).
Recent research also suggests there is a relationship between
perceiving a person as trustworthy and temperature percep-
tions. Szymkow et al. (2013) found focusing on traits unrelated
to trustworthiness did not effect perceptions of ambient tem-
perature, whereas focusing on traits relevant to trustworthiness
(i.e., communion, warmth) did. This also led the authors to
argue that perceptions of temperature—which could arguably
be stemming from bodily temperature changes—can inform
on the trustworthiness of others. The question we are con-
cerned with here is whether forming an impression of an
untrustworthy or trustworthy person inﬂuences actual physical
temperature.
PHYSICAL AND INTERPERSONAL WARMTH
There have been a number of studies linking skin tempera-
ture to interpersonal relations. For instance, social exclusion not
only makes people feel bad but it also makes them feel colder
(Zhong and Leonardelli, 2008) and this is reﬂected in actual
skin temperature (IJzerman et al., 2012). Correspondingly, tem-
porarily holding a warm object—such as a tea cup—can mend
this negative affect (IJzerman et al., 2012) and positively inﬂu-
ences judgments of interpersonal warmth (trust) and enhances
positive behavior toward others (Williams and Bargh, 2008). Phys-
ical temperature has also been found to inﬂuence trust behavior
in an economic trust game (Kang et al., 2011), and as men-
tioned above, focusing on a target persons’ psychological warmth
increases estimates of ambient room temperature (Szymkow et al.,
2013). These ﬁndings suggest a process of bodily temperature
regulation during social interaction,wherein elements of the inter-
action inﬂuence the body and vice versa. Building on these ideas
of the embodiment of social relationships, the question arises,
then, whether unconsciously picking up on untrustworthiness
(i.e., another person lying) is also accompanied by temperature
changes.
Finger skin temperature is an excellent way of assess-
ing psychophysiological change and reﬂects sympathetic
vasoconstriction—a known reaction to pain or mental and emo-
tional stressors—with an average delay of about 17 s (Kistler
et al., 1998). Although in the case of thermoregulation a lot is
still to be revealed about its causes and consequences, there are
some notable ﬁndings. For instance, a decrease in skin tem-
perature is usually associated with negative or stressful events,
such as being asked threatening personal questions (Rimm-
Kaufman and Kagan, 1996), anticipating and receiving electric
shocks (Boudewyns, 1976), watching the shower murder scene
of Alfred Hitchcock’s movie “Psycho,” hearing the noise of a
ruler slapping on a table without seeing it (Kistler et al., 1998)
or being excluded (IJzerman et al., 2012). It is also found that
the decrease in ﬁnger skin temperature that is observed dur-
ing relatively stressful events can be alleviated by a subsequent
relaxation phase (Boudewyns, 1976). Obviously, stressful expe-
riences are not the only elicitor of changes in physiology, and
with this work we aim to expand knowledge on the afore-
mentioned relationship between the social environment and
thermoregulation.
We suggest that to capture the full range of peoples’ reactions
to liars, the physiological reaction of the observer of a liar should
also be taken into account. Whereas we propose to focus on the
observer of a liar, to date, more is known about the physiology
of liars themselves (cf. Podlesny and Raskin, 1977; Wang et al.,
2010). For instance, in interrogation settings, the polygraph is
a well-studied instrument, but it is also far from perfect (see
Lykken, 1998, for a critical review). More speciﬁc to thermoreg-
ulation, the stress in a sender of a deceptive message is found to
manifests itself in blood ﬂow to the face (speciﬁcally, the orbital
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muscle area) resulting in elevated temperature in this area (Tsi-
amyrtzis et al., 2006). However, to our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst
to put forth the argument that the physiology—and in particu-
lar the thermoregulation—of the receiver of a deceptive message
should be investigated to acquire knowledge of the underlying
mechanisms of social interactions.
THE PROPOSED RESEARCH
In the proposed study, we aim to explore whether skin tem-
perature is inﬂuenced by observing liars and truth-tellers and
whether temperature relates to self-reported judgments of these
liars and truth-tellers. Previous work has provided two notions
that are of interest to the current thesis: physiological mark-
ers can precede explicit knowledge (Bechara et al., 1997), and,
these markers inﬂuence decision-making (Bechara and Dama-
sio, 2005, but see Dunn et al., 2006, for a critical evaluation). In
the case of deception detection, a physiological marker may pre-
cede explicit judgment of a liar. To our knowledge, no attempt
to ﬁnd such a physiological marker of deception detection exists
to date. Yet if this process by which physiological markers inﬂu-
ence peoples’ deception judgment could somehow aid people’s
conscious assessment of a liar, it does not seem to do so unless
they are induced to rely on their intuition (Albrechtsen et al.,
2009). For this reason, we will ask participants to rate both their
liking and trustworthiness of liars and truth-tellers, as indirect
measures, and their direct veracity judgment. We will measure
this together with ﬁnger skin temperature in two distinct sit-
uations: ﬁrst when participants are not aware they might be
lied to, and subsequently, when they are aware of this pos-
sibility. We thereby examine whether forming an impression
of a liar compared to a truth-teller, even when not having a
conscious goal of detecting deception, is accompanied by phys-
iological states that can be differentiated by measuring ﬁnger
temperature.
Below we ﬁrst describe an exploratory pilot study that was
conducted to familiarize ourselves with methods of investigat-
ing the proposed association between ﬁnger skin temperature and
unconscious deception detection. We then describe how and why
this pilot study can be improved, and then we elaborate on an
experiment that we propose to conduct which incorporates these
improvements.
PILOT STUDY1
In the pilot study there were 132 participants. Applying the same
exclusion criteria for the proposed experiment that is described
below, 18.2% of participants was excluded (1 for failure to save
the data, 21 for recognizing a target person, 2 for participating
before) leaving 108 participants (Mage = 20.62, SDage = 2.49,
64.8% female).
In the pilot study, participants ﬁrst saw a 5-min long neutral
nature movie and then saw a total of four videos of 3 min each
in which a target person either gave a truthful or an untruthful
impression of themselves (below we refer to this as the target per-
son’s veracity). While participants were watching these videos, we
1Data and accompanying syntax can be found via the link:
http://openscienceframework.org/project/bgrVB/node/YZjUB/ﬁles
measured their ﬁnger temperature. The four videos in which a
target person either lied or told the truth were structured in two
blocks of two videos each; in the ﬁrst block participants randomly
saw one truth-teller and one liar, and in the second block they
randomly say one truth-teller and one liar. After the ﬁrst block
of videos participants answered two dependent measures for both
videos in the ﬁrst block, and they again answered the same mea-
sures after the second block. This allowed us to ensure that for the
ﬁrst two videos the participants were not aware of the fact they
might be lied to, but for the last two videos they were (below we
refer to this factor as awareness). For each target person, the par-
ticipants were asked to indicate how much they liked this person,
and whether they thought the target person was telling the truth
(both on 7-point scales)2.
RESULTS OF THE PILOT STUDY
Concerning the temperature data, ﬁrst a linear mixed model was
performed on the pilot data, considering the experimental fac-
tors and linear and quadratic time as both ﬁxed and random
effects. In order to estimate the average linear trend of time and
to ease the parameter interpretation, time has been centered to
85 s, as the overall time of each video was 170 s. The intercept
(σ = 0.04, Wald Z = 7.24, p < 0.001), the effect of awareness
(σ = 0.19, Wald Z = 7.34, p < 0.001), the effect of veracity
(σ = 0.13, Wald Z = 7.33, p < 0.001), the linear effect of time
(σ < 0.001, Wald Z = 7.28, p < 0.001), the interaction between
veracity and awareness (σ = 0.57, Wald Z = 7.33, p< 0.001), and
the quadratic term of time (σ< 0.001, Wald Z = 7.09, p< 0.001)
varied randomly across participants. These results showed that
participants haddifferent intercepts, that theydiffered in the inten-
sity with which awareness and veracity affected their temperature,
that they were differently affected by veracity in different aware-
ness phases and that their linear and quadratic trends over time
differed.
In our full model, regarding the ﬁxed effects, there was
a three-way interaction between veracity, awareness and time,
b = 0.0002, F(1,73218.7) = 6.69, p = 0.010. We also found
an average (across time) interaction between veracity and time,
b = 0.0007, F(1,73218.7) = 387.14, p < 0.001, an average
(across time) interaction between awareness and time b = −0.001,
F(1,73218.7) = 993.88, p < 0.001, and a quadratic effect of time,
b = 0.000008, F(1,107.430) = 14.04. Additionally, there was a sig-
niﬁcantmain effect of awareness,b=−0.107,F(1,108.105)=6.78,
p = 0.011. There were no signiﬁcantmain effects of veracity, order,
and time. Order did not interact with the other experimental fac-
tors, and there was no interaction between veracity and awareness,
all p’s> 0.175.
These results suggest that veracity predicted temperature dif-
ferently in the unaware vs. the aware phase, and that this effect
was changing over time. To understand the interactions, we plot-
ted the average temperature over time as a function of veracity,
broken down by awareness levels (see Figure 1).
2Because the procedure of the pilot study and the proposed study are identical (with
the exceptions that we did not measure trustworthiness in the pilot study, that the
“warm up” time was shorter in the pilot study, and that we manipulate awareness
less strongly in the pilot study), we refer to the description of the proposed study
for a detailed account of the procedure and materials used.
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FIGURE 1 | Average observed (A) and estimated (B) temperature change over time in the pilot study as a function of type of video, broken down by
awareness levels.
From Figure 1, it becomes apparent that in the not aware con-
dition (i.e., in the ﬁrst block of videos) participants were warming
up over time while watching both a video of a liar or a truth-teller.
Interestingly and surprisingly, in the second block of videos (what
we have called the aware phase) ﬁnger temperature dropped when
watching a video of a truth-teller, more so than when watching a
liar.
In the pilot study, participants’ liking of the persons on the
videos was assessed (indirect judgment), and whether they felt
that the person was telling the truth (direct judgment). Liking for
liars was lower (M = 4.57, SD = 1.00) than liking for truth-tellers
(M = 5.15, SD = 0.80), t(107) = −4.873, p < 0.001, 95% CI
[−0.81, −0.34], Hedges’s gav = 0.64. The CL effect size indicates
that after controlling for individual differences, the likelihood that
a participant scores a truth-teller higher on liking than a liar is 68%.
The direct deception judgment, however, was not signiﬁcantly
different for liars (M = 5.10, SD = 1.14) than for truth-tellers
(M = 5.10, SD = 1.14), t(107)< 1, p = 1. This indicates that even
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though participants disliked liars more than truth-tellers, they did
not explicitly judge them as being more deceptive than the truth-
tellers. We conclude from this that people are indeed able to intuit
that something about a liar is “off” and sense a subtle difference
between liars and truth-tellers when their judgment is assessed in
an indirect way.
Correlations were run between temperature and liking and
temperature and veracity judgment for liars and truth-tellers. Out
of eight correlations run (temperature during a ﬁrst block-truth
with both the direct and indirect judgment of the truthful per-
son, temperature during a ﬁrst block-lie with both the direct and
indirect judgment of the liar, and the same four correlations for
the second block) there were two signiﬁcant correlations, both
in the second block: the higher a participant’s temperature while
watching a truth-teller, the more this participant thought the tar-
get person was telling the truth, r(106) = 0.26, p < 0.01, and
the more this participant thought the target person was likable,
r(106) = 0.19, p < 0.05.
To summarize, in the pilot study we found that participants’
ﬁnger temperature increased while watching a liar or a truth-teller
in the ﬁrst block of videos (i.e., when participants were not aware
of the possibility of being lied to), but in the second block of
videos (i.e., when participants were aware of the possibility of
being lied to), we found participants’ ﬁnger temperature dropped
while watching a liar or a truth-teller, but more so for the truth-
tellers. This interaction of veracity with the different experimental
phases is interesting in itself, as it shows that our design and stimuli
do indeed elicit temperature changes in our participants.
Findings of the pilot study were, however, not consistent with
the reasoning outlined in the introduction, and therefore we feel
the proposed study will provide a unique opportunity to conﬁrm
or disconﬁrm our hypothesis that participants’ ﬁnger temperature
will lower when perceiving a liar. In the pilot study, participants’
temperature was still increasing with time during the ﬁrst videos a
participant encountered (irrespective of whether they were watch-
ing a truth or a lie). The neutralmovie in the pilot studymight thus
have been too short for participants to reach a stable temperature.
We feel we can improve on the study’s procedure by allowing a
longer“warm up time.” In other words, for the proposed study, we
will present the participant with a longer neutral movie before the
target persons are presented. Results of the pilot study also indicate
that participants could differentiate between liars and truth-tellers
on the indirect veracity judgment (i.e., liking), but not on the
direct veracity judgment. In the proposed study, we aim to repli-
cate this ﬁnding to assess the robustness of this effect of indirect
deception detection, and we add to it by now also incorporating a
measure of trustworthiness of the target person. These direct and
indirect veracity judgments also allow us to replicate the ﬁnding
in our pilot study that higher ﬁnger skin temperatures correlate
with the judgment that someone is telling the truth and the lik-
ing of that person. In our opinion, these initial results provide a
tentative indication of a physiological marker intertwined with a
mechanism designed for (unconscious) deception detection.
PROPOSED EXPERIMENT: AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
The aim of this study is to assess whether ﬁnger skin temper-
ature differs when watching a liar as apposed to a truth-teller.
We thereby combine the deception detection literature with the
growing literature on embodiment. Our main hypothesis is that
temperature will lower during the watching of a 3-min video clip
of a liar (H1). We further hypothesize that participants will judge
truth-tellers more trustworthy and likeable than liars (the indi-
rect veracity judgments; H2a), with the additional hypothesis that
this effect will be bigger for the trustworthiness judgment than
for the liking judgment, because trustworthiness judgments are
suggested to be more automatic and intuitive and would there-
fore tap into the covert differences between liars and truth-tellers
better (H2b). Next to this, we hypothesize that when asked to
judge whether a target person is lying, participants’ judgment
will not differentiate between liars and truth-tellers better than
chance (the direct veracity judgment; H3). Finally, we hypothe-
size that the indirect veracity judgments, namely the liking and
trustworthiness for the target person, are positively related to
ﬁnger temperature, whereas the direct veracity judgment is not
(H4). Additionally, our proposed design allows us to infer whether
these effects interact with the level of awareness participants have
of the fact that this is a setting in which deception has to be
detected.
We regard this registered report as a unique opportunity to
shed light on ﬁndings that were obtained in our pilot study. We
aim to improve on the methods used in the pilot study by now
also including a measure of trustworthiness, and by measuring
the direct veracity judgment with a binary choice option, in order
to be able to compare our participants’ performance in detecting
deception to performance on the basis of chance (see H3). We
aim to replicate the ﬁndings of the pilot study that truth-tellers get
more positive judgments on liking (and for the proposed study,
also on trustworthiness, see H2a) and that ﬁnger skin temperature
is positively correlated with this (see H4). Most importantly, we
aim to better test our prediction that we make on the basis of
thermoregulation in (dis)trusting interactions that wewill observe
a lowering in ﬁnger temperature when watching a person who is
dishonest compared to honest (see H1), by now allowing more
time for participants to reach stable temperature.
METHOD
DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSED SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The proposed sample will consist of the TilburgUniversity lab par-
ticipants, a sample that on average consists of about 65% females,
95% University students who are mainly Psychology undergrad-
uates around the age of 21, who participate for course credit or
an hourly pay of €8. We propose to run at least 120 participants
(see below). We will apply several exclusion criteria. First, partic-
ipants who have prior experience with the temperature measure
(and its debrieﬁng) will be offered participation in another study
and will be refused participation in the current study on theoret-
ical grounds, as people may be able to consciously control their
own ﬁnger temperature (Keefe, 1978). Second, participants will be
excluded from analyses if they are acquainted with one or more
of the people depicted in the video material (assessed after all
dependent measures). This is done because knowing the target
person in this case will almost always result in being able to tell
whether what the person is saying is true (e.g., recognizing some-
one from a psychology class while this person faints an education
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in another area). Third, participants will be excluded in the fol-
lowing instances: technical failure of temperature measurement,
deﬁned as either a software error, crashing of the computer pro-
gram or a failure on the experimenter’s part to correctly start
measurement or save it (in which case no temperature recording
is present for this participant, yet other dependent measures may
be present).
Contrary towhatwas done inprevious research (IJzerman et al.,
2012), we will also run exploratory analyses without participants
who fail to reach 30◦C during watching of the neutral movie, as
some authors have argued that ﬁngertip temperature should be
high enough to observe vasoconstriction (i.e., it should be phys-
iologically possible; Kistler et al., 1998). The analyses including
these participants are the main analyses. Analyses will also be run
both with and without heavy smokers (more than 20 cigarettes a
day) as smokers can have trouble warming up after cooling down
(Cleophas et al., 1982), the analyses without them being conclu-
sive. Outliers are deﬁned as having an unlikely to be correct bodily
temperature, cut offs set at below 18◦C and above 37◦C. If outliers
are present in the data, we will employ a jackknife methodology
to conﬁrm the robustness of the results and report differences in
outcomes in a footnote.
PROCEDURE
Possible participants will enter a draftless lab room with a maxi-
mum of 12 at a time. They will be led to an individual table with
a computer separated by screens, where they sign for informed
consent. A maximum of six participants will be participating in
the current study at a given time. After completing half an hour of
unrelated tasks (to allow for acclimatization to the room temper-
ature), the experimenter will set up the current experiment run in
both Authorware and, for the temperature measure, OneWire-
Viewer. Participants’ ﬁnger skin temperature will be measured
with a so-called iButton (see Pouw et al., 2012, for software and
instructions), introduced to the participant as “a battery measur-
ing a physiological response.”The iButton will record temperature
every second. The iButton clock will be synchronized to system
seconds, and the start and end time of all videos shown will
be saved in Authorware (which also relies on system seconds to
retrieve the current time). During the time the experimenter starts
the temperature log, the participant will be asked to clean their
ﬁngers with an antibacterial wipe and to indicate which is their
dominant hand. After this the experimenter will attach the iButton
to the palmar surface of the distal phalange of the non-dominant
index ﬁnger with a double-sided EEG sticker. The participant
will then be instructed to comfortably lay their forearm on the
table with the iButton facing up, and to start working through the
experiment in Authorware.
All participants will ﬁrst see part of a nature documentary for
a minimum of 8 min allowing for the iButton to reach ﬁnger
temperature, and for the participant to reach a stable starting tem-
perature. Twoﬁller questions about this documentarywill be asked
to seemingly give the documentary a purpose and to acquaint the
participant with the overall procedure of watching a video and
subsequently answering questions about it. Next, the participants
will be told they will now watch a series of different videos. They
are explicitly informed that these videos will be presented in blocks
and that questions will follow after each block. Each block con-
tains two videos and thus after two videos questions will be asked
about the person in both videos. The participant is not told the
total number of videos that will follow, to minimize their possible
tendency to expect 50% of the videos to be untruths. In reality,
four videos will be shown in total (see Video material), divided in
two blocks of two videos. Each block consists of one liar and one
truth-teller, randomly presented. The gender of the person on the
video will also be varied to make sure lies are not confounded with
gender.
After each block of two videos, the participant will answer three
questions about each video. Firstly the indirect deception judg-
ments are assessed with two counterbalanced questions: “How
much do you like the person in the ﬁrst [second] video?” and
“How trustworthy did you think the person in the ﬁrst [second]
video was?”, responses will be given on a 7-point scale, ranging
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much). Thirdly, the direct decep-
tion judgment is assessed with the question: “Did you think the
person in the ﬁrst [second] video was telling the truth?” (yes vs.
no). Note that the nature of the questions about the target per-
sons is thus revealed after block 1, and that the participant now
knows that the possibility exists that the person in the video is
insincere. To strengthen this manipulation of the level of this
awareness, participants are told that for the next block of videos,
they will receive the same three questions about the target per-
sons. The three questions will also be presented to the participants
again in order to make sure they realize what they will be asked
after the next videos. This allows us to compare our dependent
measures in both blocks to examine the effect of this awareness
of possible deception. Lastly, the participants will provide infor-
mation on their gender, age, smoking behavior, acquaintance
with any of the people depicted in the videos, dominant hand,
and their thoughts on what the study was about. The iButton
will then be detached and the participant will be thanked and
debriefed.
VIDEO MATERIAL
Videos used in this study will display two men and two women
who have each been recorded separately while they introduce
themselves for 3 min, either truthfully or deceptively, making
eight videos in total3. These persons were instructed to give an
impression of themselves, talking about topics like their person-
ality, interests, family situation, childhood, education, and work
situation. As people frequently lie to make a good impression, for
instance in job interviews (Weiss and Feldman, 2006), impression
management is a topic particularly relevant to the current study.
Additionally, it has been found that both men and women who
have a self-presentation goal (i.e., to appear likable or compe-
tent), compared to those who don’t have this goal, lie signiﬁcantly
more in real-life interactions (Feldman et al., 2002). In our opin-
ion, this makes having to form an impression of a person on a
video—who is trying to give a good impression of themselves—an
appropriate setting in which to examine the participants’ phys-
iological responses to deceit. Target persons on the videos read
3Notice that of the eight videos, a given participant is only shown four. This ensures
that participants do not see a lie and a truth of the same target person.
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instructions that told them they were randomly assigned to tell
the truth ﬁrst, and then lie, to another participant (who, in fact,
was a confederate). They were instructed to talk about themselves
for 3 min truthfully, and were told that 3 min would feel like a
long time, so they should try to give a complete picture of dif-
ferent aspects of themselves. They directed their speech to the
confederate, who sat next to the camera. After giving this true
impression the confederate brieﬂy left the room, supposedly to
ﬁll out a questionnaire. During this time, the target person was
instructed to give an impression of themselves for a second time
when the confederate returned, while this time being untruthful.
The confederate then came in again for this second recording, and
was supposedly going to guess which one of the two times an
impression was given would be the truth.
PROPOSED ANALYSIS PIPELINE
The following pre-processing steps will be taken. First all individ-
ual temperature data ﬁles will be jointly imported to SPSS with
“TempToSPSS,” a piece of software custom programmed by SpITs,
the Tilburg University IT department. Authorware data will also
be joined and subsequently these two datasets will be combined.
As the Authorware dataset will contain a variable indicating the
time of a given video and the order in which the program ran-
domly displayed the videos, new variables can be made indicating
at what point in time (thus belonging to which temperature data)
which of the nine videos was displayed to the participant (neutral
nature video clip or one of the eight videos of four persons lying
or telling the truth), and whether a liar or a truth-teller was in it.
Next, a new time variable will be made that starts at 0 for each
new video encountered by the participant, allowing the tempera-
ture data to be displayed and analyzed over time, collapsing over
videos (all SPSS syntax steps will be made openly available online).
For each video that a participant is watching, we will compute the
participants’ temperature minus their temperature at the begin-
ning of this video, in order to ensure that any differences between
participants’ temperature at the beginning of the video will not
inﬂuence the outcomes. This way, we make sure that individual
carry-over effects from the last video that was watched are kept to
a minimum.
In the statistical models described below we refer to the
experimental factors in the following way: the factor veracity, rep-
resenting whether the person on the video was lying or not, the
factor awareness, representing whether the participant was aware
of the possibility of being lied to or not, and the factor order, rep-
resenting whether a liar was shown ﬁrst and then a truth-teller, or
visa versa.
To analyze the indirect veracity judgments, to test whether
truth-tellers compared to liars get higher judgments (see H2a)
we will estimate separate linear mixed models, one with liking
and one with trustworthiness as the dependent variable, and with
the experimental factors veracity, awareness and order as inde-
pendent variables. To analyze the direct veracity judgment (“Is
this person lying, yes or no?”) to test whether truth-tellers com-
pared to liars get different judgments we will estimate a mixed
logistic model with this binary variable as the dependent vari-
able and veracity, awareness and order as independent variables.
The same model will allow us to test whether the judgments in
each experimental phase deviate from chance (i.e., equal probabil-
ity), thus providing a test of accuracy (see H3). Furthermore, we
will compute a variable indicating whether the participant made
a correct direct veracity judgment for each video. A mixed logistic
model will be used to assess the relationship between this indica-
tion of accuracy and the participants’mean temperature per video
across different experimental phases (unaware vs. aware). Using
a random coefﬁcients regression we will also assess the relation-
ship between temperature and both liking and trustworthiness
(see H4).
The main statistical analyses’ aim is to estimate the effects of
veracity of the person on the video (lie vs. truth; see H1) and
deception-possibility-awareness of the participants (aware vs. not
aware) on participants’ temperature. In order to ease interpreta-
tion, we will center time as was done for the pilot study. Using
linear mixed models (SPSS mixed), a model will be built to deﬁne
the trajectory of temperature over time (with linear and polyno-
mial effects of time), as a function of veracity and awareness. Order
of both the independent variable (veracity) and the dependent
variables (liking and trustworthiness) will be considered in the
analysis with its main effect and interactions with the experimen-
tal factors. All repeated measures effects—intercept, polynomial
time, awareness, and veracity will be allowed to vary randomly,
removing those effects that show no variability across participants.
Variances and covariances will be tested withWald tests against the
null hypothesis of no variance, but any parameter greater than 0
will be left as random (Littell et al., 2000). When the random com-
ponents are ascertained,wewill estimate the completemodel using
restricted maximum likelihood. Satterthwaite approximation of
the degrees of freedom will be used (West, 2009). Speciﬁcally,
this full model has ID (participants) as subjects variable, includes
temperature as the dependent variable, and time as the continu-
ous (polynomial) independent variable, veracity, awareness and
order as predictors to the model. This model estimates the main
effect of type of video, the main effect of deception-possibility-
awareness, the main effect of order, their interactions and the
interaction of the experimental factors with time. This last effect
informs on whether the temperature trajectories change depend-
ing on the veracity and awareness. Order of the videos is added to
the model to account for any order and carry over effects; if order
interacts with the experimental factors we will discuss implica-
tions of this for the validity of the results, if order has a main
effect, taking this variable into account strengthens the models’
statistical power. The most important effects these models allow
us to estimate are the interaction effects of our experimental fac-
tors and time, because the expected change in temperature due to
the experimental factors should unfold over time. For exploratory
purposes, we will run our full model with gender as a ﬁxed pre-
dictor to see whether it interacts with any of the experimental
factors (if this reveals an interaction with the experimental fac-
tors, we will leave gender in the model that we report in our results
section).
In short, wewill regardH1 as conﬁrmed if the average skin tem-
perature of participants while watching a liar is lower than when
watching a truth-teller. This should translate into an interaction
between veracity and time, and possibly a main effect of verac-
ity. We will regard H2a as conﬁrmed if liking and trustworthiness
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are signiﬁcantly higher for the truth-tellers compared to the liars,
and H2b as conﬁrmed if the effect size of this effect is larger
for trustworthiness than for liking. We will regard H3 as con-
ﬁrmed if the overall proportion of correct veracity judgments
made by the participants is not signiﬁcantly different from equal
probability or if it is signiﬁcantly different from equal but lower
(due to truth-bias). We will regard H4 as conﬁrmed if liking
and trustworthiness are signiﬁcantly positively related to tem-
perature and partly conﬁrmed if either one of these indirect
measures is, whereas accuracy (on the direct veracity judgment)
is not.
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS
For temperature measurements in experiments about social rela-
tions, effect sizes in the literature are scarce, although some do
exist. For instance, IJzerman et al. (2012) found a B of −0.011 for
the effect of being excluded during an experiment that employed
a ball-tossing game. As our proposed stimuli are hypothesized to
elicit an unconscious reaction, we argue the change in ﬁngertip
temperature could be even smaller than this, and therefore we aim
to have as many participants as possible. For our design and our
speciﬁc needs we were not conﬁdent in proposing an appropriate
way of determining sample size. For this reason we propose to go
beyond the sample size suggested for a between-subjects design,
namely the suggestion for the rule of thumb to have a minimum
of 50 participants in each condition (Simmons et al., 2013). With
our exclusion criteria in mind, we set out to run a minimum of
120 participants. Note that the above-mentioned rule of thumb
is based on a between-subjects design, and our design repeatedly
measures participants’ temperature for both lies and truths, thus
is a within-subjects design. This means we will collect a mini-
mum of 160 temperature observations (measured each second of
videomaterial) four times per participant (during the ﬁrst and sec-
ond lie and ﬁrst and second truth). Thereby, this design increases
the probability of ﬁnding a ﬁnger temperature difference between
perceiving truths and perceiving lies if one exists.
TIMELINE FOR COMPLETION OF THE STUDY
After In Principle Acceptance (IPA), this study can commence
within 1–3 weeks provided that this is not during major holidays.
We estimate the study will run for 2–4 weeks in order to achieve
the desired sample size.
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